Formalisation and Proofs of the Chilean Electronic Invoices System by Attali, Isabelle et al.
HAL Id: inria-00087210
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00087210
Submitted on 21 Jul 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Formalisation and Proofs of the Chilean Electronic
Invoices System
Isabelle Attali, Tomás Barros, Eric Madelaine
To cite this version:
Isabelle Attali, Tomás Barros, Eric Madelaine. Formalisation and Proofs of the Chilean Electronic
Invoices System. in proc. of the XXIV International Conference of the Chilean Computer Science
Society (SCCC’04), INRIA, Oct 2004, Arica, Chili. ￿inria-00087210￿
Parameterized Specification and Verification of the
Chilean Electronic Invoices System
Isabelle Attali, Tomás Barros, Eric Madelaine
INRIA Sophia-Antipolis, France
(Isabelle.Attali, Tomas.Barros, Eric.Madelaine)@sophia.inria.fr
Abstract
We present the complete process of a formal specifica-
tion and verification of the Chilean electronic invoice sys-
tem which has been defined by the tax agency. We use this
case study as a real-world and real-size example to illus-
trate our methodology for specification and verification of
distributed applications. Our approach is based on a new
hierarchical and parameterized model for synchronised net-
works of labelled transition systems. In this case study, we
use a subset of the model as a graphical specification lan-
guage. We check this formal specification of the invoice sys-
tem against its informal requirements, described in terms of
parameterized temporal logic formulas. Their satisfiability
cannot be checked directly on the parameterized model : we
introduce a method and a tool to instantiate the parameter-
ized models and properties, allowing to use standard (finite-
state, bisimulation-based) model-checkers for the verifica-
tion. We also illustrate the use of different methods to avoid
the state explosion problem by taking advantage of the pa-
rameterized structure and instantiations.
1. Introduction
This work shows a case study in formal specification
and verification. It was inspired by the recent definition by
the Chilean tax administration of a new system for the ex-
change of electronic documents between sales actors (ven-
dors, buyers, and the tax administration), that will progres-
sively replace the current classical invoice system on paper.
This system is an example of a massively distributed appli-
cation, with strong constraints on security (authentication,
integrity, non-repudiation), and a number of exchange pro-
tocols between the actors, that we shall detail later. Further-
more, the administration is only defining a specification of
the application components that must be run by each ac-
tor (e.g. a vendor), and not a formally certified implemen-
tation of these components. There is an incorporation pro-
cess that the new companies should accomplish. This incor-
poration process includes testing, simulation and checking
steps. Thus, the question will arise whether specific imple-
mentations of the system components, possibly developed
by different software companies, will obey their specifica-
tion and behave correctly inside the whole system.
We use this case study to illustrate our approach to the
specification and verification of distributed applications. In
this respect, this example has a number of interesting fea-
tures: first it is a real-world application, whose (informal)
requirements have been published on the tax agency web
server. It is a large example, that fits well with the idea of
parameterized models: it has a complex component struc-
ture (17 automata in 4 levels of hierarchy), it will run with
thousands of instances of the components and the small-
est instantiation, with two actors of each type, already has a
pretty large state space (over 1012). Last, even if not a stan-
dard “critical system”, it is naturally the kind of distributed
applications for which both security and safety have a very
strong economical impact.
We are interested here in the behavioural properties of
this distributed system (the sequences of communication
events within the system, and the progress of the protocols
between the actors), and we suppose that the security as-
pects are addressed at a different level. We mainly want to
address two questions: how do we formally specify the be-
haviour of a system component, so that an implementation
can be compared to this specification ? And how do we ver-
ify that the global system, composed from a given number
of those components, behaves correctly ?
In [2] we have defined a parameterized and hierarchical
model for synchronised networks of labelled transition sys-
tems. We have shown how this model can be used as an in-
termediate format to represent the behaviour of distributed
applications, and check their temporal properties.
In this paper, we illustrate another usage of the same
model: we define a graphical language that corresponds to
a subset of our parameterized model. We use it to build a
formal specification of the electronic invoice system and
to check its properties. The graphical language retains the
main features of the formal model : labelled transition sys-
tems and synchronisation networks, in which both events
(messages) and agents (distributed objects) can be parame-
terized. The main restriction is that the network topology is
static in the current version of the graphical language; this
restriction could be lifted, as done in the case of Lotos by
Lakas [14], but this was not required for our example.
The design of the model and of the graphical language
was guided by several ideas. Having a framework based on
process algebras and bisimulation semantics made possible
to benefit from compositional methods for specification and
for verification [17, 4]. The value-passing and parameter-
ized features were strongly required, both for expressive-
ness of the model, and for better usability of the language
by application developers. For convenience, we limit data
domains to be of simple first order types; this allows us to
define methods and tools for instantiating the parameterized
models into finite hierarchical models, and to use standard
finite-state checking tools [5, 11] for verifying the system
properties. We also use a variant of the graphical language
to express a large family of safety properties, and use tem-
poral logics only for more complex properties.
We believe that a graphical notation for Labelled Transi-
tion Systems and Synchronisation Networks (in which both
events and agents can be parameterized), associated with
methods and tools for an instantiation of the parameter-
ized models into finite hierarchical models, is a mandatory
first step to bring formal methods into practical use. On
one hand, our graphical notation with parameterized fea-
tures is both intuitive and expressive enough for application
developers when formally specifying the model and its in-
tended properties; on the other hand, parameterized tech-
niques master the complexity and enhance the applicability
of these algorithms (usually limited in practice on relatively
small size systems) for specification and verification.
Our model is an adaptation of the symbolic transition
graphs with assignment of [15] into the synchronisation net-
works of [1]: we extend the general notion of Labelled Tran-
sition Systems (LTS) and hierarchical networks of com-
municating systems (synchronisation networks) from [1]
adding parameters to the communication events in the spirit
of [15]. Events can be guarded with conditions on their pa-
rameters. Our processes can also be parameterized to en-
code sets of equivalent processes running in parallel. The
parameters are typed variables of simple enumerable types:
booleans, integers, intervals, finite enumerations or struc-
tured objects.
Our approach is suitable both for compositional descrip-
tion of distributed system behaviours and for generating
models from static analysis of some source code. We have
shown in [2] how to generate models by static analysis of
the source code for ProActive applications. ProActive [6]
is a Java implementation of distributed active objects with
asynchronous communications and replies by means of fu-
ture references.
We have developed a tool which, given a finite domain
for the parameters, can generate finite labelled transition
systems and synchronisation networks from the parameter-
ized models.
Our main contributions in this work are:
• the complete process of formalisation and verification
of the Chilean electronic invoices system (the full ver-
sion is available in [3]);
• the use of this case study as a real-world and real-size
example to illustrate our methodology for specification
and verification of distributed system defined in [2];
• the development of a method and a tool to instanti-
ate the parameterized models, allowing to use stan-
dard (finite-state, bisimulation based) model-checkers
for the analysis;
• the proposal of methods to avoid the state explosion
problem, in a parameterized setting, by hierarchical
composition, hiding and grouping by variables.
In the next section we give an informal presentation of
the electronic tax system, as specified by the Chilean admin-
istration in September 2002 and we list the informal require-
ments that we shall verify on our specification. In section
3, we introduce our theoretical models. Section 4 presents
our graphical syntax to describe system behaviours. Sec-
tion 5 overviews the formalisation of the Chilean electronic
invoices using the graphical syntax. In section 6, we intro-
duce our verification methodology and give two examples
of property verification. Section 7 explains how we derive
finite instantiations and we introduce methods to limit as
much as possible the state explosion problem. Finally sec-
tion 8 introduces some related work and section 9 draws the
conclusions and the perspectives of this work.
2. Electronic invoices in Chile
In this section, we informally describe the electronic in-
voice system recently realized in Chile, as published in
September 2002; for a detailed explanation, please look at
[9].
2.1. System description
The Chilean law requires any commercial transaction
done in Chile to be supported by a legal document previ-
ously authorised by the tax agency (Servicio de Impuestos
Internos, from now on SII). There are several types of doc-
uments depending on the transaction such as the invoice for
sales, or the forms for the transportation of goods. For a spe-
cific taxpayer and document type, each emitted document is
assigned a unique number named id. Before emitting a doc-
ument, it must be authorised by SII: this is done through an
authorisation stamp specific to a set of documents, a docu-
ment type and a taxpayer. The taxpayer obtains authorisa-
tion stamps via the SII Web site. We call the emitter of an
invoice a “vendor” and its receptor a “buyer”, even if those
may be simply two different roles of the same taxpayer.
Every generated document must be sent to SII before
sending it to the buyer and before the transport of goods (if
relevant). All documents must include a digital seal, gener-
ated from the document data and the authorisation stamp.
SII has created a Web site where the buyer can verify if
an invoice has been authorised and verify whether the emit-
ter has sent the same invoice to SII than the buyer has re-
ceived.
SII
Vendor
Buyer
1. authorisation
stamps?
4. invoice
3. purchase
5. invoice
6. accept
2. stamp set
7. verify
Figure 1. Normal Scenario
The most common scenario is shown in Figure 1. In step
1 the vendor asks for authorisation stamps. SII responds
with a stamp set (step 2). Once a buyer has made a pur-
chase (step 3), the vendor generates an invoice, sends it first
to SII (step 4), then sends it to the buyer (step 5). In this sce-
nario, the buyer will accept the invoice (step 6) and later it
will verify the validity of the invoice with SII (step 7).
An electronic invoice is well emitted if it respects the for-
mat specifications defined by SII; if this is not the case, SII
will refuse it and the invoice will be considered as never
emitted. On the buyer’s side, if the transaction has never
been realized or if there are errors in the invoice informa-
tion, the buyer may refuse the invoice and consider it as
never received. Then it is the duty of the emitter to send a
cancellation of the invoice to SII.
Note that Figure 1 is just a drawing meant to explain the
application, not a part of the specification. In fact the avail-
able specification is informal, and consists in a natural lan-
guage (spanish) description of the protocols and of docu-
ment formats. Our first task then was to identify within this
informal specification the parts relative to the communica-
tion between the various subsystems, and to extract a list of
semi-formal requirements.
2.2. System properties
Some of the behavioural properties that the sys-
tem should respect are listed below. The published re-
queriments [9] focus more on the format and contents of
the electronic invoices than on the behaviour of the sys-
tem. Properties 1, 3, 4, and 6 appear explicitly in the
requirements. Properties 2, 5 and 7 do not, but they ap-
peared as useful extensions of the specification.
1. A taxpayer cannot emit invoices if it has not received
stamps from SII. More specifically, a taxpayer can emit
as many invoices as the quantity of stamps received
from SII.
2. SII gives the right answers to the invoice status request:
not present when it has not been sent to SII, present
when it has been sent, and cancelled when it has been
cancelled by the vendor.
3. Every invoice refused by a buyer must be cancelled by
the vendor.
4. An invoice id can be used only once.
5. It is not possible to cancel an invoice which has not
been emitted before.
6. Every invoice sent to a buyer, should be sent to SII first.
7. Every emitted invoice finishes being accepted by the
buyer or cancelled in SII.
In section 6.2 we formalise and verify two of those prop-
erties. All properties are formalized and fully verified in the
full version of this paper [3].
3. Definitions
In this section we introduce the theoretical model that
supports our approach. Our systems are distributed, com-
municating, asynchronous processes organised in hierarchi-
cal synchronisation networks.
We start with an unspecified set of communications Ac-
tions Act, that will be refined later.
We model the behaviour of a process as a Labelled Tran-
sition System (LTS) in a classical way [17]. The LTS tran-
sitions encode the actions that a process can perform in a
given state.
Definition 1 LTS. A labelled transition system is a tuple
LTS = (S , s0, L,→) where S is the set of states, s0 ∈ S
is the initial state, L ⊆ Act is the set of labels, → is the
set of transitions : → ⊆ S × L × S . We write s α−→ s′ for
(s, α, s′) ∈ →.
Then we define Nets in a form inspired by [1], that are
used to synchronise a finite number of processes. A Net is a
form of generalised parallel operator, and each of its argu-
ments are typed by a Sort that is the set of its possible ob-
servable actions.
Definition 2 Sort. A Sort is a set I ⊆ Act of actions.
A LTS (S , s0, L,→) can be used as an argument in a Net
if it agrees with the corresponding Sort (L ⊆ I i). Then a Sort
characterises a family of LTSs which satisfy this inclusion
condition.
Nets describe dynamic configurations of processes, in
which the possible synchronisations change with the state
of the Net. They are Transducers, in a sense similar to the
open Lotos expressions of [14]. They are encoded as LTSs
which labels are synchronisation vectors, each describing
one particular synchronisation of the process actions:
Definition 3 Net. A Net is a tuple < AG, I, T > where AG is
a set of global actions, I is a finite set of Sorts I = {Ii}i=1,...,n,
and T (the transducer) is a LTS T = (TT , s0t , LT ,→T ), such
that ∀−→v ∈ LT ,−→v =< lt, α1, . . . , αn > where lt ∈ AG and ∀i ∈
[1..n], αi ∈ Ii ∪ {idle}.
We say that a Net is static when its transducer vector con-
tains only one state. Note that a synchronisation vector can
define a synchronisation between one, two or more actions
from different arguments of the Net. When the synchronisa-
tion vector involves only one argument, its action can occur
freely.
The semantics of the Net construct is given by the syn-
chronisation product:
Definition 4 Synchronisation Product. Given a
set of LTS {LTS i = (S i, s0i , Li,→i)}i=1...n and
a Net < AG, {Ii}i=1...n, (S T , s0T , LT ,→T ) >, such
that ∀i ∈ [1..n], Li ⊆ Ii, we construct the prod-
uct LTS (S , s0, L, →) where S = S T × ni=1(S i),
s0 = s0T ×
n
i=1(s0i ), L = AG, and the transition rela-
tion is defined as:
→ {s lt−→ s′| s =< st, s1, . . . , sn >, s′ =< s′t , s′1, . . . , s′n >
,
∃ st
−→v−→ s′t ∈→T ,−→v =< lt, α1, . . . , αn >, ∀i ∈ [1..n], (αi 
idle ∧ si αi−→ s′i ∈→i) ∨ (αi = idle ∧ si = s′i )
Note that the result of the product is a LTS, which in turn
can be synchronised with other LTSs in a Net. This scheme
enables us to have different levels of synchronisations, i.e. a
hierarchical definition for a system. It also allows us to con-
sider Nets as generic parallel operators, in a process alge-
bra whose constants are LTSs. In this algebra, strong and
weak bisimulations are congruences for Nets operators, in a
way that extends naturally CCS laws.
Next, we introduce our parameterized systems which are
an extension from the above definitions to include param-
eters. These definitions are connected to the semantics of
Symbolic Transition Graph with Assignment (STGA) [15].
Parameterized Actions have a rich structure, for they take
care of value passing in the communication actions, of as-
signment of state variables, and of process parameters. In
order to be able to define variable instantiation as an ab-
straction of the data domains (in the style of [7]), we re-
strict these domains to be simple types, namely: booleans,
countable sets, integers or intervals over integers and finite
structured objects. This should also include arrays of sim-
ple types, but this is not part of this paper.
Definition 5 Parameterized Actions are: τ the non-
observable action, M encoding an observable local se-
quential program (with assignment of variables), ?P.m(x)
encoding the reception of a call to the method m from
the process P (x will be affected by the arguments of the
call) and !P.m(e) encoding a call to the method m of a re-
mote process P with arguments e.
A parameterized LTS is a LTS with parameterized ac-
tions, with a set of parameters (defining a family of simi-
lar LTSs) and variables attached to each state. Parameters
and variables have a simple type. Additionally, the transi-
tions can be guarded and have a resulting expression which
assigns the variables associated to the arriving state:
Definition 6 pLTS. A parameterized labelled transi-
tion system is a tuple pLTS = (K, S , s0, L,→) where:
K = {ki} is a finite set of parameters,
S is the set of states, and each state s ∈ S is associated
with a finite set of variables −→vs,
s0 ∈ S is the initial state,
L = (b, α(−→x ),−→e ) is the set of labels (parameterized ac-
tions), where b is a boolean expression, α(−→x ) is a parame-
terized action, and −→e is a finite set of expressions.
→ ⊆ S × L × S is the set of transitions:
Definition 7 Parameterized Sort. A Parameterized Sort is
a set pI of parameterized actions.
Definition 8 A pNet is a tuple < pAG,H, T > where : pAG
is the set of global parameterized actions, H = {pIi,Ki}i=1..n
is a finite set of holes (arguments). The transducer T is a
pLTS T = (KG, S T , s0T , LT ,→T ), such that ∀−→v ∈ LT ,−→v =<
lt, α
k1
1 , . . . , α
kn
n > where lt ∈ pAG , αi ∈ pIi ∪ {idle} and ki ∈
Ki.
The KG of the transducer is the set of global parame-
ters of the pNet. Each hole in the pNet has a sort constraint
pIi and a parameter set Ki, expressing that this ”parameter-
ized hole” corresponds to as many actual arguments as nec-
essary in a given instantiation. In a synchronisation vector−→v =< lt, αk11 , . . . , αknn >, each αkii corresponds to the αi ac-
tion of the ki-nth corresponding argument LTS.
In the framework of this paper, we do not want to give a
more precise definition of the language of parameterized ac-
tions, and we shall not try to give a direct definition of the
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?B.verify() !B[id].notIn()
!B[id].in()
!B[id].cancelled()
?Recp1[id].okCancellation() ?Recp2[id].ok()
?Recp1.okCancellation()
?B[id].verify()
?B.verify()
?B.verify()
!B.cancelled(id)
!B[id].cancelled()
!B.in(id)
!B[id].in()
!B.notIn(id)?B.verify(id)
!B[id].notIn()
?Recp2.ok()
!Recp3[id].okCancellation()
?Recp2.ok()
id : [1,maxId]
?V [id].sendCancellation()
Recp1id()
!Recp3[id].okCancellation()
?V.send(id)
!Recp3[id].ok()
Recp2id()
Reception(maxId)
!Recp3[id].ok()?V.send()
!V.ok(id)
Recp3id()
?V [id].send()
?Recp2[id].ok()
!V.okCancellation(id)
?V.sendCancellation(id)
?V.sendCancellation()
Figure 2. The reception and verification process
synchronisation product of pNets/pLTSs. Instead, we shall
instantiate separately a pNet and its argument pLTSs (ab-
stracting the domains of their parameters and variables to
finite domains, before instantiating for all possible values
of those abstract domains), then use the non-parameterized
synchronisation product (Definition 4). This is known as the
early approach to value-passing systems [17, 18].
4. Graphical Language
We provide a graphical syntax for representing static Pa-
rameterized Networks, that is a compromise between ex-
pressiveness and user-friendliness. We use a graphical syn-
tax similar to the Autograph editor [5], augmented by el-
ements for parameters and variables : a pLTS is drawn as
a set of circles representing states and edges representing
transitions, where the states are labelled with the set of vari-
ables associated with it (−→vs) and the edges are labelled by
[b] α(−→x )→ −→e (see Definition 6).
A static pNet is represented by a set of boxes, each one
encoding a particular Sort of the pNet. These boxes can be
filled with a pLTS satisfying the Sort inclusion condition.
Each box has labelled bullets on the border, each one encod-
ing a particular parameterized action of the Sort, we name
those bullets as ports.
Figure 2 shows an example of such a parameterized sys-
tem taken from the SII formalisation. It also introduces the
notation to encode sets of processes; for example, Recp1 id
encodes the set of Recp1 processes for each value in the do-
main of id. In the rest of this section, we use this example
to introduce the main graphical features of our language.
The network Reception in Figure 2 specifies the part of
the SII process in charge of receiving the documents (in-
voices and cancellations), and answering requests about the
status of an invoice. It is parameterized by the id of the in-
voice and is composed by three automata sets whose ele-
ments take care of one specific document id (of a given ven-
dor). The top right automaton (Recp2) takes care of receiv-
ing an invoice, the top left automaton (Recp1) takes care of
receiving a cancellation document and the bottom automa-
ton (Recp3) gives the status of an invoice when requested.
The responses to an invoice status for a given id are or-
exclusive: the invoice is not present at SII (!B.notIn(id)),
the invoice has been sent to SII (!B.in(id)), or the invoice
has been cancelled by the vendor(!B.cancelled(id)).
The edges between ports in Figure 2 are called links.
Links express synchronisation between internal boxes or
to external processes. Each link encodes a transition in the
Transducer LTS of the pNet.
Figure 2 introduces as well the syntax to indicate a syn-
chronisation in between more than two actions. A multiple
synchronisation is represented by an ellipse with multiple
arriving/outgoing edges from/to the ports of the processes
whose actions must be done simultaneously. All three pro-
cesses are parameterized by id. In the reception ports, the id
variable encodes the restriction that the receiving call is ef-
fectively addressed to the corresponding process (must be
a match between the identity and the id in the call). Note
that this restriction is expressed only in the port and not in
the transitions inside the automaton, for instance the recep-
tion of the ?Recp2[id].ok() call in Recp1 will fire the tran-
sition ?Recp2.ok() in the automaton.
In Recp3, initially an invoice is considered as not re-
ceived. Upon reception, its status is changed to be present
through a message sent by the Recp2 (!Recp3[id].okIn()).
Then, if a cancellation arrives for an invoice, its status is
changed to be cancelled through a message sent by Recp1
(!Recp3[id].okCancellation()). Note that the reception of a
cancellation is only possible after the reception of the in-
voice to be cancelled (only after the transition ?Recp2.ok()
is made).
The full specification of this case study has shown that
this graphical language is both expressive enough to repre-
sent a large and complex system and its interactions, and
natural enough both for the system developers to draw the
specification and for the reader to understand very intu-
itively the drawings. We are in the process of building a
graphical editor that will help the developers to create the
drawings, as well as translate them into the formal model
and display graphically the results of the verification tools.
5. Formalisation
We have used this graphical language to build pLTSs and
pNets for the formal specification of the Chilean invoices
system. The intention here is not to describe all aspects of
the system specification. We rather concentrate on the be-
haviour of the system, the communications between the dis-
tributed processes and their temporal properties.
• We assume that the communication channels are reli-
able.
• Security aspects (authentication, integrity) and docu-
ment format verification are supposed to be treated
elsewhere. All the processes in the system are trusted.
• There are only two types of documents, invoices
and cancellations and only two types of authori-
sation stamps, one for invoices and another for
cancellations. The only specific value to be con-
sidered for a document is its identification number
(id).
The reception process of SII was introduced in section 4.
In this section we concentrate on the synchronisation net-
work of the Vendor and the global system. The interested
reader will find the complete system formalisation in [3].
5.1. The Vendor system
Figure 3 shows the network that defines the behaviour of
the Vendor. It has two pairs of Stock and Id processes: one
pair for invoices and the other for cancellations. The Stock
process manipulates a stock of stamps. It provides stamps
for the generation of documents and requests new stamps to
SII. The Id process assigns a unique sequential number to
each new document (once a stamp has been provided by the
Stock process). There is one single BV process that initiates
new purchases. The purchase process (PP) takes care of the
main life’s cycle of a purchase. It is parameterized with the
variable pcrs, which encodes the number of purchases that
can be treated simultaneously (Section 4 explains the nota-
tion Pn for processes). There is a cancellation process (CI)
for each invoice id (which can possibly be cancelled). The
PP process sends requests to the Id invoices process for new
invoices ids while the CI process does so with the Id can-
cellations process.
The actions to synchronise with external processes are
represented by labelled bullets in the surrounding frame
box. Note that even when the Id and Stock processes seem
to be the same for invoices and cancellations, they could be
instantiated with different domain of variables, resulting in
different finite non-parameterized processes.
5.2. The Global System
The global behaviour of the system is formed by an ar-
bitrary number of vendors, buyers and a single SII.
The synchronisation links are labelled so they are vis-
ible. Those links reflect the possible communications
events, such as: to request new stamps from the ven-
dor v (reqNewS tamps(v)), to send the invoice id from
the vendor v to SII (sendS ii(v, id)) or to refuse the in-
voice id sent from the vendor v to the buyer b. The
global system is fully described using 15 pLTSs struc-
tured by 7 pNets in 4 levels of hierarchy.
6. Properties Verification
Given a system and a set of properties, we want to prove
that these properties hold in the system. In this section we
introduce our methodology to verify the properties listed in
section 2.2 and we explain the verification results for two of
them.
The verification tools we use work over finite LTSs. To
use them in the invoices system, we instantiate the processes
and networks and we generate the synchronisation product
(global LTS) of those instantiations. Instead of generating
directly the global LTS, we benefit from the compositional
structure of the system. We go deeply on this subject in sec-
tion 7.
?SII.getNewStamps(x : int)
?SII.getNewCancelStamps(x : int)!SII.reqNewCancelStamps()
Vendor(maxIdInv,maxIdCancel,
pcrs,buyerSet)
maxStockInvoice, maxStockCancel,
?Id.stamp()
Stock(“invoices′′,maxStockInvoice)
Id(“invoices′′,pcrs,maxIdInv)
?PP [Pn].reqNewId()
!PP [Pn].giveNewId(id : [1,maxIdInv])
!Stock.stamp()
!SII.reqNewStamps()
?getNewStamps(x)
!SII.reqNewStamps()
?PP [Pn].cancelSii()
!Id.reqNewId()
?Id.giveNewId(cancelId)
?SII.okCancellation()
CIinv()
?Id.giveNewId(id)
!Id.reqNewId()
!SII.send(id)
PPPn(buyerSet)
?BV.emit(b)
?SII.ok(id)
!SII.send(id)
?SII.ok(id)
?SII.okCancellation(inv)
!Stock.stamp()
BV(pcrs,buyerSet)
!PP [Pn].emit(b : buyerSet)
!AI[id].cancelSii()
Pn : [1, pcrs]
inv : [1,maxIdInv]
?Buyer[b].refuse(id)
?Buyer[b].accept(id)
!Buyer[b].send(id)
!SII.reqNewStamps()
?Id.stamp()
Stock(“cancellations′′,maxStockCancel)
?SII.getNewStamps(x)
!Buyer[b].send(id)
?Buyer[b].accept(id)
?Buyer[b].refuse(id)
Id(“cancellations′′,maxIdInv,maxIdCancel)
!AI[inv].giveNewId(cancelId : [1,maxIdCancel])
!SII.sendCancellation(inv)
!SII.sendCancellation()?AI[inv].reqNewId()
Figure 3. The Vendor system
The verification was done over the global synchroni-
sation product of the instantiated processes and networks
which form the system. The instantiation is made with the
variable domains described below.
6.1. Data domains
An finite instantiation of a parameterized model is an ab-
straction in the sense of [7, 19]. Starting with first order
(countable) data domains, we define abstractions in which
the abstract domain has values corresponding to a finite
number of distinguished concrete values, plus one or more
extra values representing the rest of the concrete domain.
These abstractions define Galois insertions [7]. Such an ab-
straction will preserve a given formula if it has enough ab-
stract values in the abstract domain of each parameter in the
formula, to represent each distinguished value of the param-
eter in the formula.
We observe that all the properties listed in section 2.2 in-
volve at most one buyer and/or one vendor. This does not
mean that the property should be valid for only one specific
vendor/buyer in the set of all the possible vendors/buyers,
but for every possible combination of vendors and buyers
as individual entities. Therefore, to verify the properties, it
is sufficient to instantiate the system with two vendors and
two buyers. In both cases, one encodes every vendor/buyer
as an individual entity, and the second encodes the remain-
ing vendors/buyers.
To have many invoices, as Property 1 states, we instan-
tiate the maximal number of invoices to three (invoice id
∈ [1..3]): two encode two particular invoices and the third
encodes the rest of them. The stamps for invoices in the
model are unbounded, only the stamp’s stock capacity needs
to be bounded to get an instantiation. Since SII gives in-
finitely often authorisation stamps, the system can work
with a minimal stock capacity of 1. However, we choose
to set its capacity to 3 (the vendor can get as much as 3
stamps from SII at once) to have the scenario, between oth-
ers, in which the vendor spends all the ids it received from
a single request for authorisation stamps.
Since all the invoices can be potentially cancelled, we
need at least the same quantity of cancellation ids as the
quantity of invoices, therefore we instantiate the maximum
number of cancellations to three. Following the same rea-
soning than the stamps for invoices, we also set the capac-
ity of the cancellation stamp stock to 3.
Finally, we instantiate the purchase processes that a ven-
dor can manipulate simultaneously to two: one encoding an
individual process and the other encoding all the remain-
ing processes that may be running during the life’s cycle of
the system.
Summarising, to verify our 7 properties it is sufficient
to instantiate the system with the variables values shown in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Instantiation of data domains
6.2. Verification methodology
The checking tools we use allow for checking proper-
ties in a very expressive logics: the regular μ-calculus [16],
and in a number of more classical temporal logics that trans-
late into this one. However, writing properties directly in a
temporal logic language is difficult and error-prone, and we
prefer, whenever this is possible, to express the properties
as automata, written in a variant of our graphical language.
More precisely, reachability properties, expressing sce-
narios that are desirable or not, are specified by abstraction
automata, a form of pLTSs with terminal states in which
labels are predicates over parameterized actions. This is
clearly simpler, for non-specialists, than having different
formalisms for models and for properties. Alas this is not
enough, and there are properties that cannot be checked this
way, typically fairness or inevitability properties. For those
we use directly a temporal logics, being either μ-calculus
or a variant of a higher-level action-based logic, like ACTL
[8].
6.2.1. Reachability properties The use of abstraction
automata for expressing and verifying reachability prop-
erties was advocated in the framework of the FC2Tools
[5]. They are labelled transition systems with logical pred-
icates in their labels, and with acceptance states. Each
acceptance state defines one abstract action, represent-
ing a set of traces (a regular language) from the actions of
the model we want to check.
From the original (concrete) system and the abstrac-
tion automaton (expressing the property), FC2tools builds
a product LTS, whose actions are the labels in the accep-
tance states of the abstraction automaton encoding the prop-
erty. If an action is present in the product LTS, then one of
the corresponding concrete sequence is possible in the con-
crete system. The presence of an abstract action in the prod-
uct system naturally proves the satisfiability of the corre-
sponding formula, while its absence proves the negation of
this formula.
For instance, Property 2 says: “SII gives the right an-
swers to the invoice status request, i.e.: not present when it
has not been sent to SII, present when it has been sent, and
cancelled when it has been cancelled by the vendor”.
This is a reachability property since it can be reformu-
lated as SII does not give wrong answers, i.e. a scenario that
should not be possible.
OK2
otherwise
notIn(b, v, id)
OK1
okSii(v, id)
otherwise
okCancellation(v, id)
otherwise
in(b, v, id)
notIn(b, v, id) + cancelled(b, v, id)
Wrong
in(b, v, id) + cancelled(b, v, id) cancelled(b, v, id)
OK3
in(b, v, id) + notIn(b, v, id)
Figure 5. Abstraction automaton encoding
Property 2
The abstraction automaton expressing this property is
shown in Figure 5. In this automaton, the otherwise action
means any other action different from the actions in the out-
going edges of the same state. In addition, the automaton
not only expresses that the responses are right (otherwise
the state Wrong is reached) but also that they are possible
(states OK1, OK2 and OK3 are reachable).
OK2
OK1 OK3 Wrong
Figure 6. Property 2 verification result
We have used the FC2Tools to check this property :
from the instantiated Net of the system, the tools build a
global system minimized by weak bisimulation, then build
its product with the property automaton, resulting in the
LTS in Figure 6. In the LTS, the actions OK1, OK2 and
OK3 are possible from the initial state, which means that
the paths from the initial state to those acceptance states in
the abstraction automaton (see Figure 5) are possible from
the initial state in the instantiated system. Then we have
proved that all the responses from SII to an invoice status re-
quest are possible. Likewise, since there are no Wrong ac-
tions possible in the initial state in the result, we conclude
that the path from the initial state to the state labelled as
Wrong in the abstraction automaton is not possible from the
initial state of the instantiated system. The accurate reading
of this Wrong action in Figure 5 is: a non-desired behaviour
can happen if, in the system, we start from a state different
that the initial one. Since we want to verify the property in
the initial state, we have proved that SII does not give wrong
responses to invoice status requests.
6.2.2. μ-calculus formulas The abstract automaton
method of the FC2Tools is only usable for reachabil-
ity properties. For other kinds of formulas, including
fairness and inevitability properties, we use the Evalu-
ator tool from the CADP tool-set [11]. Evaluator per-
forms an on-the-fly verification of properties expressed
as temporal logic formulas on a given Labelled Transi-
tion System (LTS). The temporal logic it used is called
regular alternation-free μ-calculus. It allows direct en-
codings of ”pure” branching-time logics including the
action-based version of CTL, called ACTL [8]. We ex-
press our desired properties in ACTL (it is much easier to
write and read than pure μ-calculus) and we use Evalua-
tor to verify the formula. The result of this verification is a
true or false answer, and a diagnostics.
For instance, Property 3 is an inevitability property since
it requests a scenario that must happen in a finite time, in all
possible futures, under a condition. We reformulate it in a
more precise way :
“If an invoice id, emitted by a vendor v to a
buyer b is refused by the buyer it will eventually be
cancelled by the vendor ”
in which the boxed actions correspond respectively to
the re f useBuyer(v, b, id) and sendCancellation(v, id) ac-
tions in the model.
We express this property using the following ACTL for-
mula:
AG(re f useBuyer(Vendor1, Buyer1, 1)
⇒ AF sendCancellation(Vendor1, 1))
To check this property, we have used our instantiation
tool to produce a hierarchical Net, instantiated with the val-
ues of Figure 4, then the FC2Tools to compute a flat, mini-
mized LTS for this system (in the FC2 format), using the op-
timisations described in section 7. This system was passed
to the Evaluatormodel-checker, together with the formula.
The result was positive: this formula holds from the initial
state of the system.
The seven properties listed in section 2.2 have been suc-
cessfully verified using this methodology. Two of them were
specified using ACTL formulas. For a complete description
see [3].
6.3. Improving the model through properties veri-
fication
The model we have introduced in Section 5 was not the
initial model we designed, but was improved after the ver-
ification of the properties listed in section 2.2. Some of the
properties were not valid in this initial model and we had to
review our formalisation to correct some parts. This verifi-
cation and review not only improve the model but also the
informal requirements defined by SII. For instance Property
5 says “ It is not possible to cancel an invoice which has not
been emitted before”. Though it sounds obvious, we had not
included this condition in the initial model since it is not ex-
plicitly written in the informal requirements. When verify-
ing Property 2, we got undesired behaviours which exposed
this lack in the initial model and so in the informal require-
ments. In fact, because of this experience, Property 5 was
added to the verification list to have a more reliable formal-
isation. Without a formal verification as described in this pa-
per, a programmer can easily overlook this condition during
the implementation phase resulting in an application with
potential and difficult to discover errors.
During this reviewing process, the instantiation tool
proved very useful as a debugging tool of the sys-
tem specification. We have done instantiations for small
domains of variables to search the reasons why the prop-
erties were not valid in the system. Due to the size of the
global LTS, those smaller instantiations were much eas-
ier to analyse than the complete instantiations.
7. Building finite automata
As explained in Section 6, the verification tools we use
can only work over finite systems. To use them, we instanti-
ate the processes and networks that form the system and we
generate the synchronisation product (global LTS) of those
instantiations.
We have developed a tool that automatically generates
a finite automaton (LTS) and/or synchronisation network
from a pLTS or from a pNet, given a finite abstract do-
main for each unbounded variable in the system. In both
cases (parameterized and instantiated), the automata and
networks are described in the FC2 format [5].
Once the system is instantiated, we avoid the direct gen-
eration of the global LTS by brute force, i.e. without any
pre-processing before calculating the global synchronisa-
tion product. This would lead us directly to the well-known
state explosion problem.
When verifying properties, usually we do not need to ob-
serve all the events in the system. At each synchronisation
product, we can hide the actions that are not involved in a
specific property and which are not required to synchronise
at a upper level. This technique, in conjunction with min-
imisation, gives promising results as shown in [3].
Additionally, we try to benefit from the parameterized
structure of the system: whenever possible, we group com-
municating processes that share a common parameter. Then
we apply hiding and minimisation to the synchronisation
product of those groups before instantiating to the common
parameter domain. In that way, we avoid the intermediate
instantiation of each member of the group by each value in
the parameter domain, and hence a potential state explosion.
For instance, in Figure 2 is shown the structure of the Re-
ception process. It is defined by a pNet that synchronises
three processes (Recp1, Recp2 and Recp3), each one pa-
rameterized by id. However, an instantiation of the Recp1
process to a particular value of id will synchronise actions
only with an instantiation of the Recp2 and Recp3 pro-
cesses to the same particular value of id, and vice-versa. In
fact, an instantiation of the Reception process is the free in-
terleaving of the three processes for each particular value
of id. Therefore, for any instantiation we have the follow-
ing equivalence, where P1|P2 is the synchronisation prod-
uct of P1 and P2 and Pi = P|P| . . . |P|P
︸︷︷︸
|i| times
:
Recp1id|Recp2id|Recp3id = (Recp1|Recp2|Recp3) id
Thus we apply hiding and minimisation to
(Recp1|Recp2|Recp3) before instantiating the id pa-
rameter.
On our machines, a brute force approach was limited to a
global LTS with approximately 5, 6×105 states. The combi-
nation of the techniques above has enabled us to scale up to
analysing a system corresponding to a brute force LTS that
would have had around 1, 2 × 1012 states (with the param-
eters values in Table 4). Using these techniques, the global
LTS (reduced by weak bisimulation) generated when veri-
fying Property 1, which requires to observe two parameter-
ized actions, contains 400 states and its bigger intermedi-
ary structure generated contains only 1,861 states. The com-
plete verification of the properties listed in section 2.2, were
done on the global LTS generated using this methodology.
8. Related Work
8.1. Case study
A similar case study is done by Tronel et al. in [20] for
the ScalAgent deployment protocol. ScalAgent is a plat-
form for embedded systems, written in Java, to configure,
deploy, and reconfigure distributed software. In [20], they
make a full automatic verification for a Ups (Uninterrupt-
ible Power Supply) management system to large scale sites,
deployed in ScalAgent.
We use a graphical approach to formalise the system
from the informal description, and we translate the informal
requirements to formal properties to be checked. In [20],
they have chosen to make an automatic translator from the
XML configuration description of ScaleAgent to LOTOS
[13], and the verification is done by reachability analysis of
ERROR states, which are included into those XML descrip-
tions.
They also use parameters but they are included in the
translation to LOTOS and not directly in the formal mod-
els as we do. This does not allow them to benefit from the
parameterized structure of the system and then get better
minimisations. Like we do, they make finite instantiations
to different parameters domains, and they use this instanti-
ation capacity to do debugging and analysis. In that sense,
they find the minimal required instantiations to check the
properties by empirical analysis.
Finally, even if we use similar theories and methods to
check properties, our aims are different. In [20], they have
developed a full automatic verification methodology spe-
cific to ScalAgent; their approach is focused on a high
level design language rather than the implementation code.
Our framework has been designed in order to address any
distributed application with asynchronous communications,
which includes the verification of implementations against
requirements.
8.2. Specification languages
There is a large literature about languages to formally de-
scribe concurrent and/or distributed systems at different lev-
els of abstraction. We focus on two of them, that could be
well suitable to our aims: NTIF [10], Promela [12].
NTIF was designed to become an intermediate language
for E-Lotos. Similar to us, NTIF defines LTSs where the
transitions encode communication events. It supports data
exchange in the communications and guarded actions (in-
cluding conditions on input values) as we do. The main
difference with our language is that NTIF is designed to
describe sequential processes whereas we do so for asyn-
chronous concurrent communicating processes. For process
composition, NTIF relies on other formalisms, even when
each particular process could be defined in NTIF. Because
of this, NTIF can not profit from modular composition and
minimisation by itself. Finally, NTIF does not have a graph-
ical language to describe systems as we do.
Promela [12] is a language designed to describe dis-
tributed systems. It does not have process hierarchy, so it
can not benefit from modular composition and minimisa-
tion. It supports simple type parameters as well as guards in
the communications actions, but it does not support param-
eterized processes (set of processes). Even when its mod-
els can be graphically visualised, it does not have a graphi-
cal input syntax to describe the systems as we do.
9. Conclusion and Perspectives
We have introduced a methodology to formally describe
a system and verify its properties, and we have validated our
approach through a real system, the Chilean electronic in-
voices. We claim that this method is suitable to a developer,
not necessarily with expertise in formal methods, by follow-
ing the methodology presented in this case study.
We focus in the behaviour properties. Other analysis
such as the data flow or data security requires other spe-
cialised methods and tools. The originality of our work can
be summarised as follows :
• We have defined a model to describe in a natural man-
ner the behaviour of distributed systems (with param-
eters) via networks of processes. This model is an ex-
tension of previous work done in [1] and [15]. We have
introduced as well a graphical syntax to describe those
networks.
• Using this graphical syntax, we have shown how to
model the Chilean electronic invoices system from its
informal specifications.
• We have developed a tool to obtain finite non-
parameterized systems from our language given the
variable domains. This generation allows us to use
off-the-shelve model-checkers.
• We have introduced a methodology to limit as much as
possible the state explosion problem during this gener-
ation.
• Finally, we have shown how to formalise and verify the
properties of the system.
Additionally, the instantiation tool provides a debugging
analysis (for a small instantiation), and allows to compare
different instantiations and search for better minimisations.
This debugging capacity provides early detection of errors
or backtrack analysis.
Our parameterized models achieve three different roles:
they describe in a natural and finite manner infinite systems
(when considering unbounded variable domains), they de-
scribe a family of systems (when considering various vari-
able domains) and they describe in a compact way large sys-
tems (when considering large variable domains).
In the medium term, we plan to integrate our parameter-
ized models with the OPEN/CAESAR facility of the CADP
tool set [11] to perform “on-the-fly” model checking. Then,
both the instantiations and the synchronisation products will
be generated as needed by the verification tool. For some
reachability properties, the generation of the whole state
space will possibly be avoided.
Once the specification is validated, we want to use it to
check the correctness of implementations. This check re-
quires a refinement pre-order that allows the developer to
make some choices amongst the possibilities left by the
specification. This is a work we plan to do in a tool that
will benefit from the compositional structure of our models.
This tool includes the generation of a parameterized model
from the source code. We do generate models for systems
implemented in ProActive [6], this generation is described
in [2].
The final goal of our team is to develop a full set of meth-
ods and tools for the description, analysis and verification of
distributed systems. These methods and tools should be as
much automatic as possible and naturally usable by non-
specialists (for instance software engineers). They should
include not only a methodology to describe a system and
verify the specifications, but also to verify the correctness
of implementations.
References
[1] A. Arnold. Finite transition systems. Semantics of communi-
cating sytems. Prentice-Hall, 1994.
[2] T. Barros, R. Boulifa, and E. Madelaine. Parameterized
models for distributed java objects. In Forte’04 conference,
Madrid, 2004. Spinger Verlag.
[3] T. Barros and E. Madelaine. Formalisation and proofs of the
chilean electronic invoices system. Technical Report RR-
5217, INRIA, june 2004.
[4] J. Bergstra, A. Pose, and S. Smolka. Handbook of Process
Algebra. North-Holland, 2001.
[5] A. Bouali, A. Ressouche, V. Roy, and R. de Simone. The
fc2tools set. In D. Dill, editor, Computer Aided Verification
(CAV’94), Standford, june 1994. Springer-Verlag, LNCS.
[6] D. Caromel, W. Klauser, and J. Vayssière. Towards seamless
computing and metacomputing in Java. Concurrency Prac-
tice and Experience, 10(11–13):1043–1061, Nov. 1998.
[7] R. Cleaveland and J. Riely. Testing-based abstractions for
value-passing systems. In International Conference on Con-
currency Theory (CONCUR), volume 836 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 417–432. Springer, 1994.
[8] R. De Nicola and F. Vaandrager. Action versus state based
logics for transition systems. In I. Guessarian, editor, Seman-
tics of Systems of Concurrent Processes, LITP Spring School
on Theoretical Computer Science, volume 469 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 407–419, La Roche Posay,
France, 1990. Springer.
[9] Gobierno de chile, servicio de impuestos internos, factura
electrónica. https://palena.sii.cl/cvc/dte/menu.html.
[10] H. Garavel and F. Lang. NTIF: A general symbolic model
for communicating sequential processes with data. In Pro-
ceedings of FORTE’02 (Houston). LNCS 2529, nov 2002.
[11] H. Garavel, F. Lang, and R. Mateescu. An overview of
CADP 2001. European Association for Software Science and
Technology (EASST) Newsletter, 4:13–24, Aug. 2002.
[12] G. Holzmann. The SPIN Model Checker, Primer and Refer-
ence Manual. Addison-Wesley, 2003. ISBN 0-321-22862-6.
[13] ISO: Information Processing Systems - Open Systems Inter-
conection. Lotos - a formal description technique based on
the temporal ordering of observational behaviour. ISO 8807,
Aug 1989.
[14] A. Lakas. Les Transformations Lotomaton : une contribu-
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